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NORTH DAKOTA’S NOVEL APPROACH
TO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
A SHIFTING LANDSCAPE IN CORPORATE MANAGEMENT
OR A FUTILE ASSERTION OF LARGE
SHAREHOLDERS’ RIGHTS?*
I.

INTRODUCTION

For many Americans, the sudden and shocking failure of the Enron
Corporation will be remembered as the most significant corporate event of
their generation.1 Indeed, the infamous collapse of the energy giant has
proven not to have simply been a seminal business event.2 Enron’s demise
and the wake of successive corporate scandals 3 have led to discussions and
subsequent measures that have marked a turning point in United States
corporate governance.4
With these scandals emerged a national dialogue focusing on corporate
accountability and protection of shareholders who invest in those institutions.5 One observer noted, “America’s shareholders are growing restless,
and the bosses of the companies they own seem increasingly nervous as

*

Winner of the 2008 North Dakota State Bar Foundation Outstanding Note/Case Comment

Award.

1. Richard D. Cudahy & William D. Henderson, From Insull to Enron: Corporate
(Re)Regulation After the Rise and Fall of Two Energy Icons, 26 ENERGY L.J. 35, 36 (2005).
2. Charles M. Elson & Christopher J. Gyves, The Enron Failure and Corporate Governance
Reform, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 855, 855-56 (2003).
3. See, e.g., John R. Kroger, Enron, Fraud, and Securities Reform: An Enron Prosecutor’s
Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 57, 84 (2005) (“Enron was a failing company propped up by
accounting games, deceptive transactions, and financial statement manipulation.”). For example,
Enron had been fraudulently reporting its financial situation to the Securities and Exchange Commission on its 10-Q and 10-K forms. Id. at 71. The WorldCom scandal also involved accounting
fraud, which included operating costs being improperly recorded as capital expenditures to disguise huge losses as profit. Kathleen F. Brickey, From Enron to WorldCom and Beyond: Life and
Crime After Sarbanes-Oxley, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 357, 369-70 (2003). The Adelphia scandal arose
out of a $2.5 billion accounting scandal that subsequently led to Adelphia’s bankruptcy. Id. at
370-71.
4. Elson & Gyves, supra note 2, at 855-56; see Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1523 (2005) (stating that
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, in which Congress legislated several corporate governance measures into
the federal securities law, is not only a considerable change in substantive law, but also a divergence in the mode of regulation).
5. See Gregory Scott Crespi, Maximizing the Wealth of Fictional Shareholders: Which
Fiction Should Directors Embrace?, 32 J. CORP. L. 381, 382 (2007) (“[C]orporate governance
practices have come under close scrutiny.”).

1162

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL . 84:1161

they peer out from behind their boardroom curtains.”6 In the 2007 legislative session, North Dakota interjected itself into this ongoing national
debate of management in public corporations by enacting the North Dakota
Publicly Traded Corporations Act (NDPTCA).7 The statute pulls together
many issues for which activist shareholder groups advocate: limiting director term limits, restricting poison pills, separating the roles of chairman and
chief executive officer, permitting votes on compensation reports, and altering plurality voting to majority voting regarding directors, among others.8
This note focuses on public corporations, companies that are permitted
to offer securities for sale to the general public, usually through the stock
markets.9 Furthermore, this note analyzes and critically evaluates both the
purpose and the practical effect of North Dakota’s newly enacted law. Part
II provides an overview of the structure and history of corporations as well
as their governance practices in America.10 Part III describes the competing
philosophies that surround the corporate governance process.11 Part IV
takes a critical and skeptical look at the desirability and feasibility of applying the NDPTCA.12
II. OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN AMERICA
Part II provides an overview of corporations beginning with Section A,
which presents a general summary of corporate governance.13 Section B

6. Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, Shareholders as Proxies: The Contours of Shareholder Democracy,
63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1503, 1504 (2006) (quoting Ownership Matters; Shareholder Democracy, ECONOMIST, Mar. 11, 2006, at 10).
7. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 10-35 (2007).
8. Id. §§ 10-35-06(1)-(3); 10-35-09(2)-(3); 10-35-12(5); 10-35-22; 10-36-06(4) (2007).
Crystal R. Reid, Corporate Landscape Changing, BISMARCK TRIB., May 6, 2007, at B1.
9. ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW 89 (2d
ed. 2004). Publicly held companies are: (1) corporations traded on a national securities exchange;
and (2) those with 500 or more shareholders and $10 million or more in assets. Steven A.
Ramirez, The End of Corporate Governance Law: Optimizing Regulatory Structures for a Race to
the Top, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 313, 317 (2007). The North Dakota Century Code makes clear that
the NDPTCA applies “only to a publicly traded corporation . . . during such time as its articles
state that it is governed by this chapter.” § 10-35-03(1).
10. See discussion infra Part II (discussing the organization, roles, and evolution of
corporations and the governance process).
11. See discussion infra Part III (examining the various opinions of what the shareholders’
role should be in a corporation).
12. See discussion infra Part IV (providing a skeptical analysis of which corporations may
have an interest in the NDPTCA, which entities may benefit from the existence of this law, how
the law addresses recent corporate scandals, and the difference of certain language in the
NDPTCA compared with contemporary corporate law).
13. See discussion infra Part II.A (presenting a broad definition of what corporate
governance is and various sources of governance for corporations).
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discusses the organization of the corporation, including the various roles
performed within the corporate structure.14 Section C provides a brief
history of the American corporation, as well as historical efforts aimed at
reforming corporations.15
A. WHAT IS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE?
While several definitions of corporate governance exist, generally the
term governs the internal affairs of the corporation, such as the “structure,
relationships, . . . and objectives of the corporat[ion].”16 Traditionally, state
law has provided the framework for the internal structure with regard to the
affairs of the corporation.17 This framework is recognized as the “internal
affairs doctrine.”18 Each state in the United States has a statute or set of
laws that governs how corporations in that state are structured, the process
for incorporation, and the configuration of the board of directors.19
Pursuant to the internal affairs doctrine, state courts are obligated to
accept the law of the incorporating state, even if that state’s law is inconsistent with the law of the forum state.20 Although some states try to regulate
foreign corporations in certain circumstances,21 the legitimacy of this is
dubious.22 For example, in CTS Corporation v. Dynamics Corporation of
America,23 the United States Supreme Court nearly made it a constitutional
mandate that the state of incorporation possess the authority to regulate the
internal affairs of the corporation.24

14. See discussion infra Part II.B (describing the responsibilities of directors, officers, and
shareholders).
15. See discussion infra Part II.C (describing the evolution of the American corporation and
historical reform efforts as compared to contemporary governance issues).
16. E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in Delaware Corporate Law and Governance from 1992-2004? A Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153 U.
PA. L. REV. 1399, 1411 (2005); see Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L.
REV. 456, 460 (2004) (“The term ‘corporate governance’ is widely used to refer to the balance of
power between officers, directors, and shareholders.”).
17. Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 16, at 1411.
18. PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 9, at 14.
19. Id.
20. See McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 209, 212 (Del. 1987) (applying Panama law
even though the rules were barred under Delaware law and the law of other states).
21. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. § 2115 (2007) (regulating corporations that have fifty percent of
property, payroll and sales factors, and outstanding securities in California).
22. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987) (“No principle of corporation law and practice is more firmly established than a State’s authority to regulate domestic
corporations.”).
23. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
24. CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 89.
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Delaware, the place of incorporation to more than half of the country’s
public corporations, has developed a body of law that is greatly respected
and considered highly influential in the area of corporate law.25 One reason
so many corporations choose to incorporate in Delaware is that its bar and
judiciary are considered extremely knowledgeable in understanding the
intricacies of corporate law.26 Further, Delaware’s case law leads to
predictability and stability for corporate planning and strategy.27
Until 2002, corporate governance was principally an issue of state
28
law.
The federal government’s role prior to 2002 was limited to the
disclosure of information to investors, mostly concerning initial public
offerings and securities trading.29 The subsequent enactment of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the federal government’s response to several large
corporate scandals, included a number of provisions impacting corporate
governance.30 For example, Sarbanes-Oxley requires the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) to promulgate rules compelling issuers to
disclose whether they apply a code of ethics to senior financial officers,31
obliges independent audit committees for all listed companies,32 and prohibits corporations from giving credit to officers or directors (with some
exceptions).33 Sarbanes-Oxley also added numerous provisions increasing
or creating civil and criminal consequences, including an additional felony
for securities fraud 34 and federal protection for whistleblowers.35

25. See HARRIET SMITH WINDSOR, DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS, DELAWARE DEP’T OF
STATE DIV. OF CORPS., 2006 ANNUAL REPORT 1, available at http://www.corp.delaware.gov/
2006%20Annual%20Report%20with%20Signature%20_2_.pdf (reporting that sixty-one percent
of the Fortune 500 companies and half of the United States firms traded on the New York Stock
Exchange and NASDAQ are incorporated in Delaware). In addition, the Delaware Court of
Chancery is a 215-year-old court that has written and shaped much of the modern corporate case
law. Id.
26. PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 9, at 16.
27. Id.
28. Jeffrey D. Hern, Delaware Courts’ Delicate Response to the Corporate Governance
Scandals of 2001 and 2002: Heightening Judicial Scrutiny on Directors of Corporations, 41
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 207, 207-08 (2005).
29. Id. at 207-08 (citing Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The
Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1438 (1992)).
30. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
31. Sarbanes-Oxley, § 406, 15 U.S.C. § 7264 (2002).
32. Sarbanes-Oxley, § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(3) (2002).
33. Sarbanes-Oxley, § 402(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(k) (2002). The company may offer credit if
it is a financial institution extending credit in the ordinary course of business and the terms are the
same as those offered to the public. Id.
34. Sarbanes-Oxley, § 807, 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (2002).
35. Sarbanes-Oxley, § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(4) (2002); Sarbanes-Oxley, § 1107, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1513 (2002); Sarbanes-Oxley, § 806, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2002).
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Additionally, the SEC and other federal agencies remain sources of
corporate governance in public companies.36 The SEC’s role in corporate
governance arises “from its mission to protect investors, maintain market
[integrity], and facilitate capital formation.”37 At times, the SEC has taken
a less direct approach to governance, such as encouraging the securities exchanges to pass governance rules as a way to advance investor protection.38
More direct regulatory attempts by the SEC have taken the form of disclosure regulation as opposed to imposing overt governance requirements.39
For example, pursuant to Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC enacted rules, which
require management participation in the assessment and certification of
internal controls in public corporations.40
Corporations also have internal documents that provide additional
sources of governance, such as the articles of incorporation.41 The articles
of incorporation provide a corporation’s functions, objectives, and some
matters of governance.42 “The articles of incorporation are wholly [publicly] filed with the secretary of state.”43 To complete the formation process,
the corporation must also adopt a set of bylaws, which are not publicly filed
as are the articles of incorporation.44 The corporation’s bylaws also include
various provisions with respect to the governance and internal affairs of the
corporation.45 Bylaws often set the rules for important functions of governance, such as rules for shareholder meetings; how the board of directors
will operate (including election and removal); and the rules with respect to
officers, agents, and employees, among others.46

36. Paul Rose, The Corporate Governance Industry, 32 J. CORP. L. 887, 892 (2007).
Agencies other than the SEC tend to play smaller roles. Id. For example, the Office of Federal
Housing Enterprise Oversight and the Commodities Futures Trading Commission provide
governance structures and rules specific to the companies and industries they regulate. Id. at 892
n.29.
37. Id. at 893 (quoting SEC, The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors,
Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation (2007), available at http://
www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. (citing Management’s Reports on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting and
Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Rates, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-8238
& 34-47, 986, 68 Fed. Reg. 36, 636, Aug. 14, 2003, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/
33-8238.htm).
41. 18A AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 171 (2004).
42. Id.
43. PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 9, at 13.
44. Id.
45. Id. A corporation’s bylaws address issues such as shareholder’s meetings (for example,
location and voting rights), the function of the board of directors, and key provisions regarding the
rules of officers and employees. Id. at 13 n.47.
46. Id.
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Finally, corporate law, as interpreted by the judiciary, also provides
important guidance.47 Case law supplies the principles of fiduciary duties,
norms, expectations, and standards designed to impact the organization,
relationships, and objectives of corporations.48 This arrangement allows
flexibility and avoids the one-size-fits-all approach that would otherwise
accompany an expansive and unyielding codified system.49 Apart from the
state, federal, and internal regulatory framework of corporations, the various roles of directors, shareholders, and managers also play a pivotal role in
the governance process.50
B. ROLES ASSUMED WITHIN THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION
One central and venerable principle of American corporate law is that
the board of directors is granted the power to manage the corporation.51
After they are elected to the board, “directors act as fiduciaries [toward] the
corporation”52 and generally consider it a fiduciary duty to maximize shareholder gains.53 The actual number of directors is usually a matter settled in
the articles of incorporation or bylaws.54 The management of a corporation
is vested heavily in its board of directors, leaving only a few specific
shareholder voting rights.55 The board of directors, while maintaining its
supervisory role, gives officers in the corporation the flexibility to execute
the board’s directives.56

47. Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 16, at 1411.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1412.
50. See discussion infra Part II.B (examining the different roles of those involved with the
corporate governance process).
51. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2007) (“The business and affairs of every
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of
directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation.”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-32 (2007) (“The business and affairs of a corporation must be
managed by or under the direction of a board.”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) [hereinafter
MBCA] (“All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the business
and affairs of the corporation managed under the direction of, its board of directors.”). See also
N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 701 (McKinney 2003) (following a statutory similar in substance, but
one that does not follow the MBCA). “[T]he business of a corporation shall be managed under
the direction of its board of directors.” Id.
52. PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 9, at 123.
53. Crespi, supra note 5, at 386 (citing NAT’L ASSOC. OF CORP. DIRS., REPORT OF THE
NACD BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION ON DIRECTOR COMPENSATION: PURPOSES, PRINCIPLES, AND
BEST PRACTICES 1 (1995)).
54. PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 9, at 124.
55. Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 561, 569 (2006); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions Where to
Incorporate, 46 J.L. & ECON. 383, 391 tbl.2 (2003)).
56. PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 9, at 123.
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The officers, charged with managing the daily operations of the corporation, receive their operational authority from the board of directors.57
Officers also assume a fiduciary duty toward the corporation and are
considered “agents” of the corporation.58 Often, authority is concentrated
in the chief executive officer and other senior level management.59
The shareholders, considered by many to be the owners of the corporation, possess the residual claim on assets. 60 While shareholders have the
right to elect and remove directors, they generally have a limited role in
corporate decision-making.61 As a general rule, shareholders possess the
right to elect directors, vote on vacancies, and vote on amendments to the
articles of incorporation and bylaws.62 However, corporate changes must
be proposed by the board of directors.63
With respect to governance matters in publicly traded firms, the issues
that arise are commonly related to the nature of the ownership in the corporation.64 For example, the shareholders of a publicly traded company are
largely dispersed.65 Most disputes in the governance of publicly traded
companies arise out of shareholders’ limited rights to participate in the
management versus the directors’ province to operate free from shareholder
interference.66
As a result of this arrangement, there is a separation of control and
ownership.67 This arrangement provides for little direct oversight by shareholders.68 It does not mean, however, that shareholders are left without
57. Id. at 126.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 127.
60. Id. at 106. But see Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting
Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601, 604 (2006) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Limited Shareholder Voting
Rights] (explaining that while shareholders own the residual claim on the corporation’s earnings
and assets, “[o]wnership of the residual claim is not the same as ownership of the corporation
itself”). For it to be possible to own the corporation, a corporation would have to be capable of
being owned. Id. However, this is impossible due to the corporation’s status as a work of “legal
fiction.” Id.; see also Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L.
REV. 789, 804 (2007) (“Corporations are independent legal entities that own themselves; shareholders own only a security, called ‘stock’ with very limited legal rights.”).
61. Anabtawi, supra note 55, at 569.
62. PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 9, at 107. Additionally, shareholders may vote on other
issues such as mergers and liquidation. Id.
63. Stout, supra note 60, at 793 (citing Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team
Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 310 (1999)).
64. PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 9, at 87.
65. Id. However, some public firms “have a concentration of shareholders that act together
to control the corporation through the election of directors.” Id. at 88. In this situation, public
stockholders assume a minority position. Id.
66. Id. at 87.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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protection.69 In addition to market constraints, shareholders also have legal
protections including: management’s fiduciary duty, proxy battles to
change management, tender offers to remove managers, and regulations of
the SEC.70
C. HISTORY OF AMERICAN CORPORATIONS AND GOVERNANCE
PRACTICES
Early in American history, companies were publicly chartered largely
for public utility purposes, such as inland navigation and toll roads.71
However, as the eighteenth century ended, the young nation needed credit
and an infrastructure to assist development, and the corporate structure best
met those needs.72 The corporate form provided a legal framework suited
to gathering the vast amount of money needed to grow capital-intensive
industries and accomplish business and pecuniary objectives.73
As the Industrial Revolution transformed the economy during the nineteenth century, America experienced increasing wealth and power concentrated in corporations.74 During this time, the public began to invest in
corporations.75 Yet it was not until the late nineteenth century that technological innovation, especially railroads, began to give corporations a strong,
influential, and long-lasting place in the economy.76 The success of the
economy was met with increasing skepticism in the latter part of that century when abuses grew rampant, especially in large corporations.77 Justice
Brandeis remarked that states had historically limited incorporation
practices because “[t]here was a sense of some insidious menace inherent in
large aggregations of capital, particularly when held by corporations.”78
Furthermore, in the late nineteenth century, states around the country
began liberalizing their corporation statutes, taking steps such as lowering

69. Id. at 88.
70. Id.
71. Sarah Helene Duggin & Stephen M. Goldman, Restoring Trust in Corporate Directors:
The Disney Standard and the “New” Good Faith, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 211, 220 (2006).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 220-21.
74. PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 9, at 5.
75. Id.
76. Duggin & Goldman, supra note 71, at 220 (citing LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY
OF AMERICAN LAW 390 (3d ed. 2005)).
77. Id. at 221.
78. Id. (citing Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 549 (1933) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)). In Liggett, Justice Brandeis noted that historically “the duration of corporate franchises was generally limited to a period of 20, 30, or 50 years.” Liggett, 288 U.S. at 555.
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taxes and generally allowing management more flexibility.79 These
changes often involved giving more authority to management rather than to
shareholders.80 For example, the ultra vires doctrine, which served to limit
corporate activities to its prescribed charter powers, was eroded.81 Further,
the notion reemerged that the authority of the board of directors was
“original and undelegated,” rather than delegated from the shareholders.82
Proxy voting also changed; where previously banned in the nineteenth
century, it became the twentieth century norm.83 Finally, shareholders lost
the authority to remove members of the board at will.84
During this period of time, monopolies dominated markets and fraud
was pervasive, two trends which undermined confidence in the economy.85
Around the mid-1910s, individual and institutional investors increasingly
became important sources of public security financing.86 Suspicion of corporations remained as corporate power continued to grow.87 The corporate
abuses and fraud facilitated considerable public distrust of large corporations and those who managed them.88
The Wall Street crash in 1929 brought yet more scrutiny from
lawmakers.89 In response to the financial disaster, the federal government
passed securities legislation.90 Interestingly enough, it was not the
American corporate structure that was the target of reforms.91 For example,
the federal securities acts of 1933 and 1934 did not seek to protect or empower shareholders.92 Rather, the laws were focused on supporting the
principles of a healthy free market.93 The enactment of these new laws
79. PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 9, at 5. In the late nineteenth century, for example, New
Jersey modified its incorporation statute to remove restrictions on “capitalization and assets,
mergers and consolidations, the issuance of voting stock, the purpose(s) of incorporation, and the
duration and locale of business.” Tsuk Mitchell, supra note 6, at 1515 (quoting SCOTT R.
BOWMAN, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT: LAW, POWER,
AND IDEOLOGY 60 (1996)). Other states also began liberalizing their general incorporation
statutes as well, including Delaware. Id.
80. PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 9, at 5.
81. Tsuk Mitchell, supra note 6, at 1522.
82. Id. (citing MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 18701960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 99 (1992)).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Duggin & Goldman, supra note 71, at 221-22.
86. Tsuk Mitchell, supra note 6, at 1521.
87. PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 9, at 5.
88. Duggin & Goldman, supra note 71, at 222.
89. PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 9, at 5.
90. Id.
91. Duggin & Goldman, supra note 71, at 222.
92. Tsuk Mitchell, supra note 6, at 1512.
93. Id.
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restricted corporate power, like the prohibition of monopolies94 and the
issuance and trading requirements established by the Securities Act of
193395 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.96 These measures, for the
most part, did not directly impact corporate governance structures.97
Since the scandals of WorldCom, Enron, Adelphia, and others erupted,
some are once again questioning the trust placed in American corporations.98 The nature of the concern, however, is considerably different. 99
From the late twentieth century to the present, as exemplified in Enron and
others, problems and scandals are interpreted as having more to do with
internal issues of the corporation, rather than how corporate strength is
applied within the economy.100 Some scholars argue these collapses point
to a failure of corporate governance structures and principles to prevent
exploitations.101 These events and subsequent investment losses reasonably
explain why governance issues are presently under intense scrutiny,
especially the relationship between directors and shareholders.102
This renewed corporate scrutiny may also explain North Dakota’s
willingness to adopt a novel act that so significantly departs from any other
corporate statute in the United States.103 Keep in mind, however, that while
the NDPTCA itself is a novel statute, the arguments surrounding increased
shareholder participation are not new.104 The following discussion explores
the differing philosophies of corporate governance.105

94. Duggin & Goldman, supra note 71, at 222-23.
95. Id. at 223 (citing 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a-77aa (1997 & Supp. 2006)).
96. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78a-78mm).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See Hearing on HB 1340 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 60th N.D. Legis. Sess.
1 (Jan. 24, 2007) [hereinafter Hearing] (testimony of William H. Clark, Jr.) (“The ultimate goal of
Chapter 10-35 is to improve the performance of publicly traded companies by providing a new
model of corporate governance.”). In addition, noting the recent scandals in publicly traded companies, “[t]he need for an alternative model of good corporate governance like Chapter 10-35
remains as important as ever.” Id. at 2.
104. See Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Corporate Democracy and Stockholder-Adopted ByLaws: Taking Back the Street?, 73 TUL. L. REV. 409, 410 (1998) (noting that scholars and
practitioners have long debated the allocation of power between directors and shareholders).
105. See discussion infra Part III (comparing and contrasting the ideas and ideals surrounding the shareholder democracy theory and the director primacy theory).
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III. COMPETING PHILOSOPHIES SURROUNDING CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
There is presently a spirited debate among several prominent corporate
law academics and observers regarding the role of shareholders in a public
firm.106 Section A considers the argument of certain scholars that increased
participation is healthy for public corporations.107 Section B considers the
potential consequences of increasing shareholder participation.108
A. SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY
According to some prominent academics, the time has come to reevaluate the relationship structures of American corporate law.109 They
advocate for the idea of a shareholder democracy, where shareholders have
a stronger voice in the management of corporations.110 Such a role assumed
by shareholders would improve corporate governance arrangements.111 The
support for increased shareholder participation comes from the notion that
shareholders are the principals of the corporation and management is in
place to act as “agents” in directing the firm.112

106. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment,
119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1739 (2006) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Director Primacy] (noting that
increasing shareholder power would result in inefficiencies); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Letting
Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1784, 1784-85 (2006) (arguing that substantial
impediments facing shareholders should be reduced when they seek to replace incumbent directors and that shareholders should have more power to make decisions to change governance
arrangements); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 833, 836 (2005) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Increasing Shareholder Power] (questioning the
distribution of power between boards and shareholders under current corporate law); see also
Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 BUS. LAW. 43 passim
(2003) (stating the case for shareholder access to the corporate ballot and proposed SEC Rule 14a8); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk’s
Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1759, 1759 (2006) (responding to
Bebchuk’s shareholder proposals from the perspective of an open but traditionalist perspective);
Bainbridge, Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, supra note 60, at 636 (arguing against increasing
shareholder power as evidenced by the benefits provided in the director primacy model).
107. See discussion infra Part III.A (noting the arguments for increased shareholder
participation).
108. See discussion infra Part III.B (analyzing the director primacy model of corporate
governance).
109. See Bebchuk, Increasing Shareholder Power, supra note 106, at 913 (arguing that the
time has come to allow shareholders to make “rules-of-the-game” decisions, because for too long
it has been a process controlled by management and directors).
110. See id. at 850 (explaining that management and shareholders’ interests do not always
“fully overlap,” and increased participation by shareholders “can provide constraints and incentives that reduce deviations from shareholder-value maximization”).
111. Id.
112. See id. at 911 (noting that managers are “imperfect agent[s] for shareholders”). But see
PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 9, at 106 (stating that there is no actual legal principal/agent
relationship between shareholders and directors in the corporate context).
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Additionally, proponents of the shareholder democracy concept contend management will not always maximize the long-term value of their
shares, because management has priorities and interests that may diverge
from shareholders.113 For example, directors have little incentive to ensure
a strong financial performance in the corporation since they do not themselves possess a significant financial interest in it.114 Consequently, agency
costs can arise from this departure of interests.115 As a result, agency costs
could have the effect of decreasing shareholder value.116 Without adequate
oversight from shareholders, management may inappropriately divert
resources, reject acquisitions that could benefit shareholders, over-invest in
certain areas, etc.117 Accordingly, increasing shareholder influence and
power over the decision-making process provides “constraints and incentives” on management and takes an essential step towards resolving the
agency issue.118
Additionally, Delaware’s dominance as the major state of incorporation
has been criticized as producing “a race to the bottom” because the laws
favor management.119 Critics argue that management of a corporation will
seek to incorporate into states that have pro-management laws in order to
protect their interests, such as Delaware.120 Since a state has an economic
incentive to encourage corporations to incorporate within their borders,121
the theory argues that other states will follow that method to attract

113. See Bebchuk, Increasing Shareholder Power, supra note 106, at 908 (arguing that
increased shareholder participation would reduce agency costs between directors and
shareholders).
114. Stout, supra note 60, at 790.
115. PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 9, at 102. From a law and economics approach, the
relationship between the shareholders and management is described as an agency relationship. Id.
In the corporate context, the managers (acting as agents of the shareholders who are considered
the principal) may have interests that diverge from shareholders and will not always act in the
shareholders’ interests. Id. This increases the agency costs. Id. Agency costs can involve monitoring expenditures, bonding expenses (where the agent tries to assure the principal that costs will
be curtailed), and residual losses. Id.
116. Bebchuk, Increasing Shareholder Power, supra note 106, at 850.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 9, at 15-16 (citing Liggett v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 557-58
(1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
120. Id. at 16.
121. See STATE OF DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, 2005 DELAWARE FISCAL
NOTEBOOK, available at http://finance.delaware.gov/publications/fiscal_notebook_05/Section02/
sec2page24.pdf (stating that in 2005, franchise fees paid by corporations and other entities to the
State of Delaware generated around $500 million, or over seventeen percent of the state’s general
fund revenues).
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businesses, leaving shareholders without a state or set of laws that
adequately protect their interests.122
On the other side of the debate, critics argue vigorously against the
notion that Delaware corporate law has caused a “race to the bottom.”123
Indeed, many see Delaware’s and other states’ “management friendly” laws
as benefiting shareholders, not harming them.124 Section III.B addresses the
rationale for maintaining the division between shareholders and
managers.125
B. DIRECTOR PRIMACY
From a director primacy perspective, Delaware has not caused a “race
to the bottom” because it would be counterintuitive for a board to incorporate into a state that would hurt shareholders and possibly result in devalued shares.126 This would harm both management and shareholders
because lower valued shares could possibly make the corporation a target
for a takeover.127 Hence, the management of the underperforming company
would likely be replaced with new management by the purchasing corporation.128 Accordingly, management will search for a state of incorporation
that will enhance the value of the corporation’s shares.129 Under a director
primacy theory, risk and flexibility and a rejection of the “shareholder
democracy” notion both go toward running an efficient, profitable
corporation.130
1.

Risk and Flexibility

The director primacy philosophy provides that the board of directors is
in the best position to deal with all of the corporation’s constituents, which
include shareholders, employees, creditors, customers, suppliers, and

122. See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663, 665-66 (1974) (noting the competition between state governments to attract
corporations by offering the most advantageous laws to management).
123. PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 9, at 16.
124. Id.
125. See discussion infra Part III.B (putting forth the justifications for maintaining separation
of directors and shareholders).
126. PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 9, at 16.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See discussion infra Part III.B (analyzing how a corporate board can effectively serve as
an entity for efficient decision-making and why the notion of a shareholder democracy is a
misnomer).
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others.131 In the public company, it is necessary to have a way of gathering
the preferences of various constituencies and convert them into collective
decisions.132 Having a centralized decision-making body allows the firm to
be responsive to the shareholder who is concerned about the value of his or
her stock, the customer who cares about the product, and the worker concerned about wages and his or her work environment.133 The problem with
shareholder activism is that it interrupts the means by which a large public
firm is able to operate; the centralized and flexible decision-making process
that is well-suited for a large corporation is disrupted.134
In addition to efficiencies, the board of directors can provide risk-based
decisions via the business judgment rule.135 Generally, the business judgment rule is described as a presumption that “in making a business decision
the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis . . . and in the
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company
[and its shareholders].”136 The business judgment rule protects not only the
decision itself, but also serves to protect directors from incurring personal
liability.137
The rule essentially promotes the maximization of stockholder value.138
Stockholders benefit from a profitable company that can attract capital and
expand earnings as well as earning potential.139 Shareholders expect a
board not to be risk averse.140 If a corporation’s goal is one of economic
maximization, then shareholders’ reactions are not necessarily economically
optimal.141 Shareholder reactions do not always take into consideration the
risk necessary for achieving higher rewards, and to that end, these reactions
should not be encouraged or facilitated.142 If corporations choose to modify
their structure, directors must be careful so as not to be risk averse in

131. See Bainbridge, Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, supra note 60, at 626 (stating that
one virtue of a public corporation is that it provides structured upper management well-suited to
making important decisions).
132. Id. at 622.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 626.
135. E. Norman Veasey, The Stockholder Franchise Is Not a Myth: A Response to Professor
Bebchuk, 93 VA. L. REV. 811, 815 (2007).
136. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 747 (Del. Ch. 2005) (quoting
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)).
137. Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 16, at 1422.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Veasey, supra note 135, at 815.
142. Id.
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executing their statutory directive to manage the business and affairs of the
corporation.143
2.

Rejection of the “Shareholder Democracy” Notion

As previously stated, shareholder democracy envisions shareholders
having a more active role in the management of a corporation, thereby improving corporate governance.144 The idea of a shareholder democracy
certainly holds an emotional appeal.145 Yet for critics, the idea is eschewed
that corporations should be compelled to embrace political principles, such
as the notion of shareholder democracy.146 Indeed, a proponent of the
NDPTCA stated, “Being incorporated in North Dakota will represent a new
seal of approval for publicly[]traded corporations committed to corporate
democracy and improved performance.”147 However, the characterization
of a corporation embodying true democratic principles is a somewhat unfair
and unrealistic mixing of two diverse institutions that are governed by
different models.148 The fusion, though improper, endures because of
“intelligentsia’s far greater comfort and familiarity with political models
and events than with knowledge and appreciation of how markets function.”149 These political and corporate institutions are not one and the
same.150 The modern corporation is not a political creation; rather, it is a
conception of market forces.151
The comparison of political and corporate democracy is unfair on several grounds.152 For example, note the voluntary nature of investing into a
corporate entity as opposed to the reality that living in a polity is

143. Id. at 814.
144. See discussion supra note 109 (making the case for allowing shareholders to formulate
“rules-of-the-game” decisions, rather than leaving the process to be controlled by management
and directors).
145. Stout, supra note 60, at 803. “This larger myth of the benefits of shareholder control
has captured hearts and minds not because it is based on evidence but because it has tremendous
emotional appeal.” Id.
146. Henry G. Manne, The “Corporate Democracy” Oxymoron, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2007,
at A23.
147. Hearing, supra note 103, at 1 (testimony of William H. Clark, Jr.).
148. Manne, supra note 146, at A23.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. There is virtually no aspect of the corporation, also known as “capitalism’s greatest
invention,” that cannot be traced to market influences. Id.
152. See Usha Rodrigues, The Seductive Comparison of Shareholder and Civic Democracy,
63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1389, 1397 (2006) (“[C]orporations and political states are marked by
differences so fundamental that it is dangerous to extrapolate lessons from one realm to the
other.”).
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involuntary.153 People have the choice of investing in various other forms
of entities besides the corporate form, such as limited liability companies,
partnerships, or nothing at all.154
Further, the very idea of corporate democracy is undemocratic in several ways.155 Power among shareholders is based upon the amount of
money invested in the corporation, not based upon an individual’s status as
a citizen, which is the case in a political democracy.156 Finally, a so-called
corporate democracy could actually work to disenfranchise other corporate
stakeholders like customers and employees, unless they have the desire and
means to purchase stock.157 Disenfranchisement occurs because the shareholders possess the authority to make decisions for the corporations other
non-shareholder stakeholders, such as the employees and consumers.158
While it is true that there are other legitimate and sound theories for
distributing control this way, it serves to note that using the term “corporate
democracy” or “shareholder democracy” is misleading and often misapplied.159 Our nation’s government derives legitimacy from the idea of a
“government of the people, by the people, for the people.”160 However, a
“democracy” with respect to shareholders is a narrow goal, which aims only
at increasing corporate decision-making participation161 and is almost entirely motivated by financial incentives.162 Presently there is no substantive
concept of shareholder democracy unrelated to market demands.163 In
addition to the “shareholder democracy” rationale for enacting this legislation, there are other reasons to be skeptical of the NDPTCA.164

153. Id. at 1398.
154. Id.
155. Thomas J. Woo, Corporate Governance and the “D-Word,” 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1579, 1579 (2006).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1587-88.
159. Id. at 1579.
160. Id. at 1587 (quoting President Abraham Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19,
1863)).
161. Id.
162. Tsuk Mitchell, supra note 6, at 1576.
163. Id.
164. See discussion infra Part IV (analyzing whether corporations will utilize the NDPTCA
in any large number (if at all), whether the law fixes the fraud of recent corporate scandals, and
several unique provisions included in the NDPTCA).
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IV. A SKEPTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE NDPTCA
It is important to note that incorporating under the NDPTCA is an entirely optional decision for a corporation.165 The NDPTCA does not affect
publicly traded corporations already incorporated in North Dakota, unless
they choose to amend their articles of incorporation to be included under
the new statute.166 Existing corporations in North Dakota, public or nonpublic, are currently subject to North Dakota’s Business Corporation Act
(BCA).167 The NDPTCA is not mandatory, so any new public corporation
may still incorporate only under the BCA, and be subject to the provisions
of the BCA alone.168 On the other hand, if a corporation wanted to place
itself under the NDPTCA, the corporation would additionally opt into the
NDPTCA and would then be governed by both the NDPTCA and the
BCA.169
To the extent that the NDPTCA has provided an additional choice for
corporations, the law may be viewed as attractive since an increase in
choice is thought to be desirable in almost every market.170 In fact, “the
more-choice-is-better” argument is central to the “race-to-the-top” or shareholder democracy advocates.171 These advocates have long argued that the
lack of choice for increased shareholder power in the market has resulted in
reduced shareholder wealth and benefited opportunistic managers.172
However, despite the NDPTCA’s provision of an additional option for
corporations, reasons remain to doubt any actual benefit.173 To begin, it is
relatively unclear whether corporations or shareholders actually want these
measures, especially all of the provisions contained in the law.174 After all,
the very nature of statutory law cannot account for the wide range of

165. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-35-02(6) (2007) (“‘Publicly traded corporation’ or ‘corporation’
means a corporation as defined in section 10-19.1-01:(a). That becomes governed by chapter 1019.1 after July 1, 2007; and (b). The articles of which state that the corporation is governed by
this chapter.”).
166. Id.
167. Id. § 10-19.1.
168. See id. § 10-35-02(6) (maintaining that the articles of incorporation must state that the
corporation will be governed by the NDPTCA).
169. Id.
170. See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Choice and Federal Intervention in
Corporate Law, 87 VA. L. REV. 961, 991 (2001) (responding to a proposed federal regulatory
scheme that would arguably increase shareholder welfare).
171. Id. at 966.
172. Id.
173. See id. at 964 (remaining skeptical of a proposed rule that would increase shareholder
power).
174. See Veasey, supra note 135, at 814-15 (stating that adopting governance proposals that
reach too far could have adverse and unintended consequences).
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characteristics and circumstances of diverse corporations.175 Even if the
provisions of the NDPTCA appealed to a corporation, the corporation could
adopt any one of the provisions (or all of them) in chapter 10-35 of the
North Dakota Century Code simply by amending their articles of incorporation or bylaws.176 Indeed, many boards are already modifying their policies
on governance matters regarding poison pills, staggered boards, and changing plurality to majority voting.177
In the following discussion, Section A includes an analysis of which
corporations may be interested in incorporating under this statutory
scheme.178 Section B discusses whether this law begins to fix or address
the governance problems associated with recent corporate scandals.179 Section C includes an analysis of who may benefit and who may not under this
new law.180 Finally, Section D notes the unique language applied in the
NDPTCA in comparison with contemporary corporate statutory
language.181
A. WHO MIGHT UTILIZE THE NDPTCA?
Potential benefits mentioned with the adoption of this law were
increased revenue through franchise fees, infrastructure growth (needing
more attorneys as a result of corporations incorporating into the state,
resulting in increased litigation) and national recognition.182 Setting national recognition aside, for the other “benefits” to be realized, public
corporations would actually have to incorporate in North Dakota.183 However, it is relatively unclear which corporations would find this law desirable, and further, might actually take steps to incorporate under this new

175. Id. at 825.
176. See PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 9, at 13 (noting that the bylaws of a corporation
contain many of the governance structures with respect to the corporation); Anabtawi, supra note
55, at 569 (stating that corporate statutes generally grant shareholders the right to adopt, amend,
and repeal bylaws).
177. Veasey, supra note 135, at 814.
178. See discussion infra Part IV.A (discussing scenarios under which companies might
incorporate under the NDPTCA).
179. See discussion infra Part IV.B (analyzing the gap between what the NDPTCA addresses
and recent corporate scandals).
180. See discussion infra Part IV.C (exploring which types of shareholders are likely to be
the beneficiaries of the NDPTCA and which are not).
181. See discussion infra Part IV.D (taking note of the unique statutory language contained
in the NDPTCA).
182. Hearing, supra note 103, at 2 (testimony of William H. Clark, Jr.). “Enactment of
Chapter 10-35 will be an opportunity for North Dakota to portray itself as committed to the future
of capitalism and to strengthening the economy for the benefit of everyone.” Id.
183. See id. (noting the franchise fees and infrastructure growth potential).
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law.184 The following discussion may not be an exhaustive list of ways a
corporation could incorporate under North Dakota’s new statute, but provides three basic incorporation scenarios for doing so.185
1. Existing Public Corporation’s Board of Directors
Reincorporating by Choice
The first option for utilization of the NDPTCA would be that an
existing corporation’s board of directors would choose to reincorporate
under this new statute.186 However, this seems unlikely since one important
factor when choosing a state of incorporation is centralized management;
that is the ability to make efficient decisions for the corporation.187 Since
aspects of this law would take authority away from management in various
ways, management would almost certainly be hesitant to even consider this
law.188 Managers making the decision of where to incorporate, or even
considering a reincorporation, would likely choose a state that embraces a
centralized management system.189
Since an incumbent board of directors is unlikely to initiate this action
on its own, an alternative plan of action might be to change the make-up of
the board by electing directors who would pledge to reincorporate the
company under the NDPTCA.190 However, replacing even a majority of
directors on the board could take some time, especially if the directors’
terms are staggered.191 It could take shareholders more than one annual
election cycle to replace a majority of the board.192

184. See Hearing on HB 1340 Before the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 60th N.D. Legis.
Sess. (March 19, 2007) (statement of Secretary of State Al Jaeger) (“[W]e don’t know . . . we have
no idea of where [the corporations are] going to come from.”).
185. See discussion infra Part IV.D.1-3 (discussing several ways a company could, could
not, or may not want to apply the NDPTCA to the corporation).
186. See Stout, supra note 60, at 793 (noting that it is the board of directors who must initiate
changes to the corporation).
187. See Bainbridge, Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, supra note 60, at 622.
188. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-35-22 (2007) (limiting the duration of a poison pill,
which is an antitakeover device); id. § 10-35-24 (restricting the minimum ownership for triggering
poison pills); id. § 10-35-25 (stating the bylaws or articles of incorporation may restrict or prohibit
the adoption of a poison pill by the corporation); id. § 10-35-26 (requiring that any antitakeover
rule in the articles of incorporation or bylaws have approval of two-thirds of the shareholders and
a majority of directors who are not officers in the corporation); id. § 10-35-27 (providing that the
NDPTCA should be construed to favor shareholders by “enhancing” and “protecting” their rights).
189. See Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 106, at 1749 (stating that the corporate
hierarchy is well-suited to address the issues involving various corporate constituencies).
190. Interview with Joshua Fershee, Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Dakota,
Grand Forks, N.D. (Aug. 20, 2007) [hereinafter Fershee].
191. Anabtawi, supra note 55, at 569. Staggered boards are put in place so that at any given
time a majority of the board will be composed of members who have served at least one year. 2
FLETCHER CYC. CORP. § 334.10. The staggering of terms is usually accomplished by providing at
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Further, once these new members are theoretically elected to the board
of directors, there is no guarantee they would want to reincorporate to a
state where the directors’ authority would be significantly weakened by the
NDPTCA.193 Indeed, it may be that a board of directors wanting to appear
“shareholder friendly” and who would actually be willing to make such a
significant change as to move the state of incorporation, would arguably
already be inclined to accept the type of proposals in the NDPTCA.194 If
so, changing the state of incorporation would not be necessary if these
changes could all be achieved without going through the process of reincorporation.195
2.

Reincorporation Forced by Insurgent Shareholders

The second option, where an insurgent group forces reincorporation,
also seems rather unlikely, since shareholders currently lack the authority to
initiate a change in the state of incorporation.196 Presently, there is no state
statute which provides a process for reincorporating to a different state.197
Reincorporation generally takes the form of a merger and only the board of
directors may initiate a vote on a merger proposal.198
3.

New Public Corporation by Volition

One additional scenario for NDPTCA utilization is a newly created
public company that would choose to incorporate under this new law.199
Yet studies of corporate behavior as companies initially go public do not
necessarily support this scenario.200 This is most evident from studies in
the context of initial public offerings, also known as “IPOs.”201 The process of “going public” by corporations gives every incentive to create a governance structure that appeals to investors.202 If more shareholder control
the outset that there shall be different classes of directors. Id. For example, a board may have the
first class holding terms of one year; the second class, two years; and the third class, three years.
Id.
192. Anabtawi, supra note 55, at 569.
193. See discussion supra note 188 (providing examples of situations where the board of
directors’ authority would be weakened).
194. Fershee, supra note 190.
195. Id.
196. Bebchuk, Increasing Shareholder Power, supra note 106, at 844.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Fershee, supra note 190. However, substantial numbers of new incorporations or reincorporations under the NDPTCA appear unlikely. Id.
200. Stout, supra note 60, at 802.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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over the company meant better returns for shareholders, IPO corporations
could potentially boost the amount of capital raised by enacting shareholder-friendly provisions.203 However, studies indicate that when IPOs
use provisions to modify the voting rights of shareholders, they have generally weakened shareholder rights.204 For example, throughout the 1990s,
between thirty-four and eighty-two percent of IPO charters contained
provisions for staggered boards, effectively making it more difficult for
directors on the board to be removed.205
A more recent and remarkable example of the trend to weaken shareholders’ authority is found in the Google IPO.206 Google’s use of a dualclass charter207 virtually left outside investors powerless.208 Google’s dualclass charter gave its founders shares with multiple votes, while the public
could only get shares with one vote.209 Accordingly, if shareholders really
wanted more authority over the governance of the corporation (and that in
turn would truly maximize shareholder wealth), shareholders would have
shunned the Google IPO.210 Conversely, investors, including sophisticated
investors, oversubscribed the stock.211 In any case, the Google example
demonstrated that investors did not consider increased shareholder participation so important as to withhold their investment.212 While investors
themselves may not view increased shareholder participation as a beneficial
part of investing their money, Part IV.B evaluates which groups may
actually benefit from the NDPTCA.213

203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Thomas J. Chemmanur & Yawen Jiao, Dual-Class IPOs, Share Recapitalizations, and
Unifications: A Theoretical Analysis, 1 (Dec. 2004), http://www.fma.org/Chicago/Papers/
dualclassIPOandunificationandrecapitalization.pdf. When companies go public, entrepreneurs
and insiders incorporate into the charter the voting structure of the shares. Id. Most corporations
select a single class share structure, which means one share equals one vote. Id. However, a
considerable minority (roughly eleven percent of U.S. IPOs in 2001 and over sixteen percent in
2002) pick a dual class voting structure, where one class of shares has more voting rights than
another class. Id.
208. Stout, supra note 60, at 802.
209. Lynn A. Stout & Iman Anabtawi, Sometimes Democracy Isn’t Desirable, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 10, 2004, at B2, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB109209528252887073.html?
mod=todays_us_marketplace.
210. Stout, supra note 60, at 802.
211. Id.
212. See id. at 802-03 (noting that investors had “revealed” a preference for a corporation in
which they retained little power as shareholders).
213. See discussion infra Part IV.B (evaluating the potential benefits and drawbacks of the
NDPTCA).
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B. WHO IS THE DESIGNED BENEFICIARY OF NORTH DAKOTA’S
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STATUTE?
As previously discussed, advantages mentioned with the adoption of
the NDPTCA were increased revenue through franchise fees, infrastructure
growth, and national recognition.214 Yet the question of benefits also raises
the issue of exactly who might benefit from the law.215 Equally important
to explore are some potential drawbacks if the NDPTCA were applied to a
corporation.216
1.

Who may benefit and who may not?

“Chapter 10-35 will be the first state corporation law to focus on
providing a new model of shareholder rights that builds upon the best
thinking of large institutional investors.”217 Part IV.B.1.a notes that it may
indeed be large and institutional investors who benefit from this law, given
the significant hurdles an average investor would face with respect to the
NDPTCA.218 Further, Part IV.B.1.b looks at the nature of average public
stockholders and their generally apathetic attitude towards the governance
process.219
a.

Significant Hurdles

North Dakota’s new law has been touted as the nation’s first
“shareholder-friendly” law, but to which shareholders this new legislation is
“friendly” is an interesting query.220 A proponent of the NDPTCA stated,
“today an investor with a large position in a corporation may be essentially
locked into its investment and have no choice but to focus on improving the
governance of the corporation.”221 The NDPTCA, even if adopted and used

214. See supra text accompanying note 182 (noting the alleged benefits mentioned in
conjunction with adopting the NDPTCA).
215. See discussion infra Part IV.B.1 (examining the hurdles and other reasons why small or
average investors may not benefit from the NDPTCA).
216. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing how the board of directors may serve as a
body to protect shareholders from each other).
217. Hearing, supra note 103, at 1 (testimony of William H. Clark, Jr.).
218. See discussion infra Part IV.B.1.a (noting the huge financial hurdles to access some
provisions of the NDPTCA).
219. See discussion infra Part IV.B.1.b (observing the widely accepted notion that most
shareholders in a publicly traded company are rationally apathetic).
220. See Reid, supra note 8, at B1 (stating that the law has been publicized as a progressive
infrastructure law for public corporations).
221. Hearing, supra note 103, at 2 (testimony of William H. Clark, Jr.) (emphasis added).
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by a corporation, would not necessarily benefit the small or even average
investor.222
Certain portions of the NDPTCA do embrace the idea that all shareholders may participate in the governance process.223 Yet in other places of
the act there remain significant restrictions on who may participate, such as
accessing the corporation’s proxy statement.224 If a shareholder is not a
“qualified” shareholder, he or she is not entitled to nominate candidates on
the proxy.225 To be considered a “qualified shareholder” the law requires
that the person or group own more than five percent of the outstanding
shares.226 Additionally, the law provides that shareholders demanding a
special meeting must own at least ten percent of the voting power of all
shares entitled to vote.227
Though the proxy requirement and the special shareholder meeting in
the law contain seemingly insignificant hurdles of five and ten percent, it is
important to keep in mind that these provisions pertain specifically to the
public corporation.228 A public corporation’s capitalization229 is likely to be
substantial.230 For example, in 2005 the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) listed the median market capitalization as $1.7 billion, with the
largest market capitalization as $371.7 billion and the smallest as $4.8
million.231 In 2005, the median market capitalization of the S&P 500 was
222. See Cheryl Nichols, The Importance of Selective Federal Preemption in the U.S.
Securities Regulatory Framework: A Lesson From Canada, Our Neighbor to the North, 10 CHAP.
L. REV. 391, 394 n.2 (2006) (defining small investors as individuals who invest relatively small
amounts of money in the U.S. securities markets); INV. CO. INST. & THE SEC. INDUS. ASS’N,
EQUITY OWNERSHIP IN AMERICA 10 (2005), available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/rpt_05_equity_
owners.pdf (noting that median household financial assets in equities was $65,000 and that equity
owners, on average, held fifty-five percent of their household financial assets in individual stock
or stock mutual funds in 2005). See also Antony Page, Taking Stock of the First Amendment’s
Application to Securities Regulation, 58 S.C. L. REV. 789, 816 (2007) (noting that private
investors directly own a small percentage of securities).
223. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-35-05(1) (2007) (“Any shareholder of a publicly
traded corporation may propose the adoption, amendment, or repeal of a bylaw.” (emphasis
added)).
224. See id. § 10-35-08(2) (restricting access to only “qualified shareholders”). In public
corporations, voting occurs before the shareholder meeting, since most shareholders do not attend.
PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 9, at 110. The use of proxies allows shareholders to vote on
certain matters or to delegate their vote to another who will be present at the meeting. Id.
225. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-35-08(3) (2007).
226. Id. § 10-35-02(8).
227. Id. § 10-35-13(1).
228. Id. § 10-35-02(6).
229. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 223 (8th ed. 2004) (defining capitalization as “the total par
value or stated value of the authorized or outstanding stock of a corporation”).
230. See Wilshire Assoc., Fundamental Characteristics of the Wilshire 5000, http://www.
wilshire.com/Indexes/Broad/Wilshire5000/Characteristics.html (noting that public corporations
command a total market capitalization of more than $16 trillion).
231. NYSE COMPOSITE INDEX (2006) http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/key_benefits_nya.pdf.
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around $9.8 billion.232 The average investor’s portfolio,233 coupled with the
fact that many investors these days are diversified among companies, makes
it even less likely that a small or average investor would have the requisite
five or ten percent required amount in a single public corporation to trigger
certain provisions. 234 For example, taking the median capitalization of a
corporation on the NYSE of $1.7 billion, the five or ten percent triggers
would require a shareholder to have $85 million or $170 million, respectively.235
This section does not intend to argue that certain triggers or hurdles
should not be established with respect to shareholder access and the governance process, because there are many thresholds in corporate law today.236
However, thresholds should be carefully considered.237 For example, section 10-35-08 of the North Dakota Century Code (requiring only a five
percent trigger to access the company’s proxy) is patterned after an SEC
proposal from 2003.238 Some critics have suggested that a more appropriate
threshold for this type of provision would be a twenty-five percent trigger,
because it would establish a more substantial shareholder interest and
would be a more trustworthy indicator that the costs and disruption of contested elections is reasonable.239 An elevated threshold would also lessen
the probability of a corporation receiving a director contest proposal from a
232. Stephen Biggar & Robert Gold, These 40 Stocks—the PowerPicks 2005 Portfolio—
Represents S&P Analysts’ Top Choices From Among the 1,500 That They Cover, BUS. WK.
ONLINE, Jan. 3, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 170351 (Westlaw).
233. INV. CO. INST. & THE SEC. INDUS. ASS’N, supra note 222, at 10.
234. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Constitutional Conception of the Corporation, 4 SUP. CT.
ECON. REV. 95, 134 (1995) (“Most individuals either hold diversified portfolios of investments or
invest in corporations indirectly through institutions such as mutual funds. Accordingly, they care
little about the internal affairs of individual companies”); Page, supra note 222, at 816 (noting that
vast majority of securities are institutionally owned and not directly held). Equities these days are
much less likely to be selected by individuals and more likely to be held as part of a “large portfolio of stocks weighted by their market capitalization.” Id. (quoting Utpal Bhatacharya & Neal
Galpin, The Global Rise of the Value-Weighted Portfolio 1, AFA Chicago Meetings Paper (Mar.
2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=849627).
235. NYSE COMPOSITE INDEX, supra note 231; N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-35-02(8), (13)
(2007).
236. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-35-17 (requiring shareholder consent before a firm
issues shares having more than twenty percent of the outstanding votes); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT
§ 6.21(f)(1) (2002) (establishing a similar twenty percent requirement for the issuance of shares).
237. See John J. Castellani & Amy L. Goodman, The Case against the SEC Director
Election Proposal, in Shareholder Access to the Corporate Ballot, 21 (2004), available at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/hjackson/alumnipapers/SEC_Director_Election.Castellani.and
.Goodman.pdf (urging caution in that a specific voting trigger would be available to shareholders
of all public companies, not only those with an ineffective proxy process).
238. Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 48, 626, 68 Fed.
Reg. 60, 784 (Oct. 23, 2003) (proposing Rule 14a-11); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-35-08; Hearing,
supra note 103, at 3 (testimony of William H. Clark, Jr.).
239. Castellani & Goodman, supra note 237, at 21.
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single large shareholder with a personal grievance against the company or
its board.240 Whether the threshold is five or twenty-five percent, they both
likely mean the average or small shareholder will not to be able to achieve
these financial hurdles, nor as discussed below, will they likely make the
effort to aggregate their shares due to rational apathy of shareholders in
public firms.241
b.

Shareholder Apathy

It is not simply the amount of money it takes to access some provisions
of the NDPTCA that shows the law assists large shareholders; it is also the
nature of shareholders that make up a public firm.242 A single shareholder
need not possess the entire five percent, ten percent, or whatever trigger
level is required, because they may collectively pool their resources with
other shareholders.243 However, the likelihood of a small or average shareholder initiating this action is unlikely, since “shareholders face well-known
collective action and rational apathy problems.”244 The shareholders of a
publicly traded company are generally considered passive and would rather
sell their shares than challenge the management of the corporation.245
An example of rational apathy is given where, in the case of a director
challenge from activist shareholders, smaller or average shareholders frequently lack incentives to become informed about the competing candidates
for whom they are voting.246 “This is the classic problem of rational apathy: for the average shareholder, collecting and absorbing the necessary
information will entail a much higher opportunity cost than the expected
benefit, which is low because most shareholder votes will have little individual impact on the outcome.”247 Since shareholders lack the incentives and
information to make a decision, it is more cost effective to convey the
information to a central place to have the board make the collective

240. Id.
241. See discussion supra note 231 (noting that the median capitalization of the NYSE is
$1.7 billion); see also discussion infra Part IV.B.1.b (discussing the potential millions of dollars it
may take shareholders to access certain provisions of the NDPTCA and the apathetic nature of
shareholders in a public corporation).
242. See PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 9, at 87 (noting that shareholders of public
companies are by and large widely dispersed).
243. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-35-02(8) (2007). “‘Qualified shareholder’ means a person or
group of persons acting together.” Id.
244. Choi & Guzman, supra note 170, at 987.
245. PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 9, at 111.
246. John F. Olson, Professor Bebchuk’s Brave New World: A Reply to “The Myth of the
Shareholder Franchise,” 93 VA. L. REV. 773, 784 (2007).
247. Id.
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decision.248 Consequently, shareholders would rather entrust decisionmaking authority to the board of directors because in the long run, this
efficient system will maximize shareholder wealth.249
Shareholder activism sometimes wins support from smaller shareholders, but it is spearheaded in each case by large shareholders.250 Large
shareholders have more at stake and are more inclined to battle than small
shareholders.251 Herein lies the issue with a statute like the NDPTCA:
larger shareholders will simply have a larger voice.252 A fair question to
ask is whether this “greater voice” of large shareholders could place smaller
shareholders at risk of becoming disadvantaged if large stockholders are
given a more active role in the governance process.253 The following section discusses several examples where large shareholders use their influence
at the expense of other shareholders.254
2.

Potential Drawbacks: Shareholder Opportunism

Corporate management has been criticized for opportunism, yet shareholders are not excluded from this type of action, either.255 Directors are
certainly capable of making opportunistic threats.256 However, the difference between director and shareholder opportunism is that, “unlike shareholders, directors do not benefit financially from making threats, at least not
in their positions as directors.”257 One way to look at the power given to
the board of directors is that it serves shareholders by protecting them from
one another.258 The director primacy model can help referee the deep
divisions between shareholders, especially large shareholders, who may
have private interests in conflict with maximizing overall shareholder value
and who are most likely to exercise their shareholder power.259

248. Bainbridge, Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, supra note 60, at 624 (citing KENNETH
J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 68 (1974)).
249. Id.
250. Rodrigues, supra note 152, at 1404.
251. Id.
252. See id. (“It is true that in shareholder democracy larger shareholders have a greater
voice.”).
253. See Anabtawi, supra note 55, at 575 (explaining that certain shareholders in public
firms may have private interests that can actually work to disadvantage some shareholders).
254. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing the role that opportunism may play among
various shareholders).
255. See Anabtawi, supra note 55, at 575 (stating that shareholders in public firms may have
private interests that can lead to opportunistic behavior).
256. Stout, supra note 60, at 797.
257. Id. (emphasis omitted).
258. Id. at 794.
259. Anabtawi, supra note 55, at 564.
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Shareholders may use persuasion not only to enhance shareholder
values, but also to attain private benefits.260 In theory, one shareholder, or
several shareholders holding the same preferences, would be able to specify
with one voice an objective for running the corporation.261 Nonetheless, if
shareholders have private interests, they may have a preference that the
company pursue certain interests differently and possibly at the expense of
other shareholders.262 These existing private interests no longer make it
appropriate to think of shareholder action “as a collective good.”263
Shareholders could use their own interests, for example, to pursue labor
interests, push forward a “social” agenda, or obtain “greenmail” benefits.264
In addition, “rent-seeking” activities by shareholders are a concern that
may result in reduced shareholder value.265 The costs of rent-seeking are
manifested in distorted decision-making and resources spent in transferring
wealth.266 A classic example of how a shareholder can create costs within a
corporation is the du Pont investment in General Motors (GM).267 Du Pont
substantially increased its equity interest within GM in order to obtain a
large portion of GM’s leather, paint and varnish business.268 After buying a
large amount of stock, du Pont used its influence as a large shareholder and
became the major supplier to GM of those foregoing products.269 The GM
case illustrates a large investor using influence to further its private interests, even though the transaction increased production costs for GM.270 The
deal generated an interest cost for GM shareholders because GM had entered into a less than favorable agreement with du Pont.271
The Perry Capital example is a more modern instance of “rent-seeking”
where a large investor used their power to push for strategies that increased
the worth of another security held by the investor.272 Perry Capital, a hedge

260. Id. at 574.
261. Id. at 575.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 720
(2007). “Greenmail” is the buying back of stock by a corporation from a transient, threatening
investor at a preferential price to end the threat of a takeover. David Manry & David Stangeland,
Greenmail: A Brief History, 6 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 217, 224 (2001).
265. Anabtawi, supra note 55, at 575. “‘Rent seeking’ is the socially costly attempt to obtain
wealth transfers.” Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 576.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Stout, supra note 60, at 794.
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fund, acquired a block of Mylan Laboratories common stock.273 Simultaneously, Perry Capital entered into a derivatives contract with a brokerage
firm that allowed Perry Capital to keep its Mylan Laboratories votes while
hedging away its financial interest in the stock.274 Perry then used its status
as a large shareholder to pressure Mylan’s board of directors to acquire
another company, King Pharmaceuticals.275 This acquisition took place at a
hefty premium over market price.276 Why would Perry, as such a large
shareholder in Mylan, want Mylan to overpay for King Pharmaceuticals?277
Likely because Perry Capital was also a large shareholder of King stock and
had not hedged away its economic interest in King.278 In other words, Perry
had retained the voting rights as a Mylan shareholder without any of the
financial risk.279
Indeed, deep divisions exist between shareholders of a corporation. 280
Some shareholders have long-term interests, and generally have little regard
for short-term developments.281 However, a short-term investor sells and
buys shares frequently and is concerned with short-term values of stock.282
These two interests can lead to a divergence in preferences as to how a
corporation makes decisions.283 For example, short-term investors would
prefer short-term inflation of stock, while long-term shareholders would be
willing to forego the short-term gains for future appreciation.284 Certain
shareholders are primarily interested in a big profit in a short time and keep
a “laser-beam focus on quarter-to-quarter earnings.”285 Other examples of
divergent shareholders’ interests include diversified versus undiversified
shareholders 286 and inside versus outside shareholders.287

273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 794-95. Perry set up a complicated trade so that it had practically no exposure to
changes in Mylan’s stock price, which likely would have dropped if it purchased King. Posting of
Justin Hibbard to Deal Flow [hereinafter Posting of Hibbard], http://www.businessweek.com
/the_thread/dealflow/archives/2006/ 01/the_not_so-divi.html (Jan. 11, 2006, 13:20 EST).
279. Posting of Hibbard, supra note 278.
280. Anabtawi, supra note 55, at 577.
281. Id. at 579.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 581.
284. Id.
285. Strine, supra note 106, at 1764. “[Short-termism] helped create managerial incentives
that contributed to the debacles at corporations like Enron, WorldCom, HealthSouth, and
Adelphia.” Id.
286. Anabtawi, supra note 55, at 583.
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Whatever the different interests of shareholders may be, du Pont and
Perry Capital serve as cautionary tales and illustrate the danger inherent in
changing corporate laws in a way that gives opportunistic shareholders in
public firms greater leverage over boards.288 Indeed, transferring more authority to shareholders will likely only aggravate rent-seeking behavior.289
Certainly providing shareholders with more rights can create risks to other
shareholders, but the following section addresses an equally important
issue: Whether the NDPTCA actually works to address the scandals and
frauds that have beleaguered some corporations.290
C. THE NDPTCA DOES LITTLE TO ADDRESS RECENT CORPORATE
SCANDALS
In the wake of apparent executive malfeasance and director negligence
of recent corporate scandals, there have been renewed calls for increased
shareholder participation.291 In fact, testimony by a proponent of the
NDPTCA stated that the scandals of Enron and WorldCom law have not
ended.292 While the NDPTCA modestly addresses the recent anger caused
over CEO compensation,293 there is likely little or nothing in the rest of the
Act that would have prevented or minimized the damage caused by the
scandals of Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, and others.294
In these recent scandals, federal disclosure rules were violated and
fraud was committed.295 Yet, the frauds perpetrated in those cases bear
little relationship or remedy to the main thrusts of the NDPTCA, which
applies restrictions on antitakeover defenses and enhances shareholders’
power to adopt bylaws and vote, among others.296 Keep in mind that
current reform efforts, as embodied in the NDPTCA, are aimed to some
extent at “reunifying” ownership and control in the modern public

287. Id. at 586. Inside shareholders are shareholders who are firm employees as opposed to
outside investors who invest externally. Id.
288. Stout, supra note 60, at 795.
289. Anabtawi, supra note 55, at 577.
290. See discussion infra Part IV.C (explaining that there is little or nothing in the NDPTCA
to protect shareholders from the frauds of recent corporate scandals).
291. Stout, supra note 60, at 806.
292. Hearing, supra note 103, at 2 (testimony of William H. Clark, Jr.).
293. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-35-12(5) (2007). The statute obliges the compensation committee of the board of directors to report to the shareholders at each regular meeting of shareholders. Id. Shareholders are able to vote as to whether they accept the report, but only on an
advisory basis. Id.
294. See Stout, supra note 60, at 806 (“Enron did not collapse because its shareholders did
not have enough power.”).
295. PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 9, at 129.
296. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-35-05, 10-35-22 to -25 (2007).
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company.297 Reunifying ownership and control is very different from the
frauds committed in the last few years, and none of the provisions in the
NDPTCA address disclosure or strengthen criminal penalties for fraud.298
In addition, if directors or officers within a publicly traded corporation
commit fraud by withholding or falsifying information, shareholders are
helpless to protect themselves in any case.299 Simply stated, the provisions
of the NDPTCA do not address any further measures that would protect
shareholders from these fraudulent actions.300
Aside from failing to deal with real issues in corporate governance,
there are some provisions in the NDPTCA that use unique language with
respect to business statutory schemes.301 That is, certain provisions appear
to have no corresponding counterpart in any other business statute.302
Section D compares the enabling shareholder rights language to other
business statutory schemes.303
D. PROVISION PROVIDING UNIQUE LANGUAGE COMPARED WITH
CONTEMPORARY CORPORATE LAW
The NDPTCA creates a rule of construction mandating that the “provisions of this chapter and of chapter 10-19.1 must be liberally construed to
protect and enhance the rights of shareholders in publicly traded corporations.”304 The statutory directive to liberally construe the Act has no
counterpart in either the 1984 Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA),
the current version of the MBCA, the BCA, or in any other of North
Dakota’s corporate statutes.305 Its requirement of “liberal construction,”
which is sometimes found in remedial306 or consumer307 legislation is

297. Anabtawi, supra note 55, at 569.
298. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 10-35; see Ethiopis Tafara & Robert J. Peterson, A Blueprint for
Cross-Border Access to U.S. Investors: A New International Framework, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 31,
39 (2007) (stating that many of the recent corporate fraud cases involved incorrect and deceptive
disclosures that broke existing laws).
299. Interview with Jason Kilborn, Visiting Professor of Law, University of North Dakota,
Grand Forks, N.D. (Feb. 3, 2007).
300. Id.
301. See § 10-35-27 (calling for the statute to be interpreted liberally to protect and increase
shareholder rights).
302. See discussion infra Part IV.D (discussing the unique language placed in the NDPTCA
compared with contemporary corporate law).
303. See discussion infra Part IV.D (contrasting and comparing the NDPTCA with other
corporate statutes).
304. § 10-35-27.
305. N.D. CENT. CODE tit. 10 (2007); id. § 10-19.1; MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT (2002);
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT (1984).
306. See AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 185 (2007) (explaining that the purpose of liberal
interpretation of remedial statutes should be to give them a fair construction and promote justice).
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applied here in the context of corporate law.308 Business entity law differs
from consumer or remedial legislation in that it largely deals with individuals who freely choose to invest financial resources and are aware of the
rules and risks up front.309
Further, the directive to construe the Act to “enhance” shareholder
rights finds no similar provision in any version of the MBCA, or any other
North Dakota corporate statutes.310 The language singling out shareholders
as the group whose rights are to be protected and enhanced is interesting in
light of all the constituencies a corporation serves.311 While this language
of favoring shareholders is consistent with the overall concept of the
NDPTCA, its inclusion in a business law statute is an unusual step to be
sure.312
V. CONCLUSION
Regardless of whether North Dakota’s new corporate governance
statute is ever realized in actual application, the central message behind this
new law is that the balance between shareholders and directors is in need of
a massive overhaul.313 Even Sarbanes-Oxley, the federal response to recent
corporate scandals, which presented a marked departure in the federal government’s role of corporate regulation, certainly did not mandate or even
suggest a fundamental structural overhaul between shareholders, managers,
and directors.314 After hundreds of years of American corporate law, a
delicate but important balance has been achieved within our distinctive

307. See 21 C.J.S. Credit Reporting Agencies § 36 (2007) (“Generally, consumer protection
statutes are to be construed liberally and broadly in favor of consumers.”).
308. § 10-35-27.
309. See Stout, supra note 60, at 801 (explaining that an often-overlooked fact of business is
that investors are not forced to purchase shares in public corporations). Alternatively, investors
have the option of investing in closely held corporations, sole proprietorships, partnerships, and
limited partnerships. Id.
310. N.D. CENT. CODE tit. 10 (2007); id. § 10-19.1; MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT (2002);
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT (1984).
311. See Bainbridge, Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, supra note 60, at 626 (noting all the
constituencies affected by corporate governance).
312. See Fershee, supra note 190 (noting that the language enhancing shareholder rights is a
nod to the overall notion of the entire statute).
313. See Veasey, supra note 135, at 816 (replying to several major proposed reforms of
Lucian Bebchuk with respect to increasing the authority of shareholders).
314. See PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 9, at 130 (stating that Sarbanes-Oxley tried to
regulate corporate governance by increasing the monitoring of corporations and managers);
Romano, supra note 4, at 1523 (noting that Sarbanes-Oxley altered the traditional authority of the
state and federal government by providing specific legislative directives for SEC regulation,
something formerly perceived as the states’ exclusive jurisdiction).
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federalist system, and a fundamental overhaul is unnecessary.315 The system in place (apart from the NDPTCA) is an arrangement that balances the
relationships and responsibilities of directors, shareholders and officers
along with what is generally the appropriate role of the state and federal
governments to manage the internal affairs and regulate the markets.316
Bearing in mind the rational apathy and financial hurdles shareholders
face in accessing some provisions of the NDPTCA, this new law is clearly
not about “corporate democracy,” but rather provides tools for the large
investor.317 Recent shareholder activism certainly demonstrates that large
shareholders can find it worthwhile to agitate for changes within corporations.318 For example, Kirk Kerkorian, with his almost ten percent stake in
GM, was able to place an ally on the board of directors and pressure for
overall strategic changes.319 Carl Icahn successfully used his status as a
large shareholder of Time Warner to have the company buy back twenty
billion dollars worth of stock and was able to place two directors on its
board.320 An investor with a significant share of stock at Six Flags effectively replaced the CEO,321 and an individual shareholder resisting Novartis
AG’s acquisition of Chiron Corporation brought the deal into doubt.322
Individual shareholders are not the only activist shareholders, as evidenced
by the institutional activities of California Public Employees’ Retirement
System (CalPERS) and the American Federation of State, County, and
Municipal Employees.323
Protecting shareholders is and always should be a priority, but increasing some shareholders’ power via the NDPTCA is not the way to protect
shareholders from fraud.324 Rather, the concept of a shareholder democracy
appears to be driven by emotion and an assumption that greater shareholder
control must be a good thing, “like Mom and apple pie.”325 Even if corporate management and directors respond to activist shareholders and adopt
315. See Veasey, supra note 135, at 817 (noting that American corporate law has achieved a
delicate balance not only based upon federalism, but also including the balance of the rights and
responsibilities of the shareholders, directors, and managers).
316. Id.
317. Fershee, supra note 190.
318. Rodrigues, supra note 152, at 1403.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 1403-04.
322. Id. at 1404.
323. Id.; Chad Terhune & Joann S. Lublin, At Home Depot, CEO “Pay Rage” Boils Over in
Vote, WALL. ST. J., June 2, 2006, at A3 (describing shareholders’ voting power).
324. See Stout, supra note 60, at 806-07 (noting that the recent corporate scandals transpired
at a time when shareholders had more power than ever before).
325. Id. at 809.
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different codes of practice, these are not signs that individual shareholders
are gaining a more meaningful voice in the corporate decision-making
processes.326
Additionally, not only do the foregoing examples show that large
shareholders find it worthwhile to “agitate for change,” but that they are capable of accomplishing their objectives without the help of North Dakota’s
new law.327 North Dakota’s novel approach to corporate governance will
likely face challenges with respect to corporations that will actually incorporate under this law—and it may be the overall impact of this law is little
to nothing.328 Yet, with the premise of this law looking to assist large
stockholders, perhaps whether one thinks North Dakota’s new law is a good
idea depends on how much they trust those large shareholders.329
Stacey Dahl*

326. Tsuk Mitchell, supra note 6, at 1575.
327. See William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 1375,
1428 (2007) (entertaining the idea that in some way activist shareholders’ record of governance
success is impressive to the point that they may have “shifted the balance of corporate power in
the direction of outside shareholders and their financial agendas”).
328. See discussion supra Part IV.A.1-3 (discussing three scenarios where a corporation
might incorporate under the NDPTCA and reasons the company would be unable to do so or
would choose not to do so).
329. See Rodrigues, supra note 152, at 1404 (referring to voting proposals within a public
corporation, but also noting that in a shareholder democracy, large shareholders have a larger say
in the affairs of a corporation).
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